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CHAPTER 15 
Zoning and Land Use 
RICHARD G. HUBER* 
§ 15.1. Constitutional Validity of Frontage Requirements - Inverse 
Condemnation. During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court in 
MacNeil v. Town of Avon l reversed an earlier decision in which the 
Appeals Court had invalidated, on constitutional grounds, a particular 
application of a local zoning by-law requiring at least 200 feet of frontage 
as a prerequisite for a special permit to build multiple housing units. 2 In so 
doing, the Court rejected a public benefit-private interest balancing ap-
proach for determining whether the specific application of a zoning by-law 
constitutes an unconstitutional taking of land. Moreover, the Court held 
that reasonable frontage requirements are constitutional because they 
may further legitimate objectives of zoning which substantially relate to 
the public interest. 3 
The interrelated provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of 
the United States Constitution that prohibit the taking of property without 
just compensation and the deprivation of property without due process of 
law, respectively, are the two principal mandates under which a zoning 
by-law might be found unconstitutiona1.4 It is well-established that the 
* RICHARD G. HUBER is Dean and Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the research and writing assistance provided by 
Jonathan Schneps. 
§ 15.1. 1 386 Mass. 339, 435 N.E.2d 1043 (1982). 
2 1981 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1287,422 N.E.2d 479. See Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 
1981 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW, § 1l.5, at 255-56. 
3 Id. at 342-43, 435 N.E.2d at 1046. 
4 See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA AND J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480-96 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as NOWAKJ. In addition, MAss. CONST. Part I art. 10 provides that: 
"whenever the public exigencies require that the property of an individual should be 
appropriated for public use, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor." 
The fifth amendment protection against the taking of land without just compensation is 
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) (citing, Chicago, Burlington & Tumey R.R. Co. 
v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1877». The Chicago Burlington case can equally be 
understood as interpreting the taking clause to be a necessary requirement implicit within 
the meaning of due process. 166 U.S. at 239; see also NOWAK, supra, at 482-83. Whether 
addressing the taking issue as arising from incorporation or substantive due process analy-
sis, it is clear that the two constitutional provisions are intertwined. 
1
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enactment of comprehensive zoning regulations generally represents a 
valid exercise of the police power.s Nevertheless, a due process violation 
exists if the land use or zoning ordinance is "clearly arbitrary and unrea-
sonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, mor-
als, or general welfare."6 As a corollary, the foregoing standard is appli-
cable to an otherwise constitutional ordinance which may be suspect only 
as applied to the specific attributes of a particular parcel of land.7 In an 
action contesting a community's exercise of the zoning power, the plain-
tiff must prove that the ordinance in question is arbitrary and unreason-
able and must overcome a strong presumption in favor of constitutional-
ity. 8 The level of proof needed to overcome the presumption is that which 
removes the issue from the realm of reasonable debate9 or beyond rea-
sonable doubt. IO 
In addition to due process considerations, a zoning ordinance must not 
be implemented so that it results in a taking of property without just 
compensation. Most land use regulatory schemes, even those which sig-
nificantly affect the value of property, are generally held not to be 
confiscatory and thus do not require the payment of compensation. I I 
There is, however, a certain point at which a regulation's effect upon 
property rights is so great as to constitute the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain. 12 The problem, of course, is determining when this point 
is reached. Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to set forth 
a clearly defined approach for deciding the "taking" issue,13 and thus has 
allowed states to proscribe independently the scope of land use and 
zoning laws through judicial interpretation,14 several factors have been 
S See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
6 /d. at 395. 
7 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185, 188 (1928); see also Jenckes v. 
Building Commissioner of Brookline, 341 Mass. 162, 165-66, 167 N.E.2d 752, 760 (1960). 
8 See generally I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 3.14 (2d ed. 1976); 
Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 233, 284 N.E.2d 891, 898-99 (1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. ll08 (1973). 
9 Turnpike Realty, 362 Mass. at 233, 284 N .E.2d at 898-99; see also I R. ANDERSON, 
supra note 8, at § 3.22. 
10 Knight v. Building Inspector of Shrewsbury, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 826, 826, 350 N .E.2d 
468, 468 (1976); see also, I R. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at § 3.22. 
II See generally Mugeler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365 (1926); see also Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (diminution in 
value of plaintiffs land from $800,000 to $60,000 did not require compensation); Metromedia 
Inc. v. San Diego, 433 U.S. 490(1981) (property use controls constraining freedom of speech 
yet furthering an aesthetic public interest are valid exercises of the police power for which 
compensation is not required); Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1981 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW 
§ 11.2, at 244-49. 
12 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
13 See NOWAK, supra note 4, at 483, 485. 
14 For examples of how several jurisdictions have handled the "taking" issue, see: 
2
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established by the United States Supreme Court at one time or another as 
dispositive in a "taking" inquiry. Foremost on the list has been the degree 
of diminution in value of the plaintiff's land. For example, in Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon,ls which struck down a state statute that 
effectively eliminated the right of a coal company to mine on its privately 
held land, the Supreme Court stated: "[W]hen [the extent of diminution] 
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an 
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." 16 The 
"taking" inquiry has also been held to necessitate a judicial weighing of 
public interests served by the ordinance against the extent of the plain-
tiff's loss of property rights. The case of Agins v. City of Tiburon 17 is 
illustrative of what may be called a "balancing approach." 18 In upholding 
the facial constitutionality of a zoning by-law that prohibited plaintiffs 
from constructing multiple residential dwellings,19 the United States Su-
preme Court explained: 
The zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public by serving 
the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly development of residential 
property for open space areas. There is no indication that the appellant's 
5-acre tract is the only property affected by the ordinances. Appellants 
therefore will share with other owners the benefits and burdens of the city's 
exercise of its police power. In assessing the fairness of the zoning ordi-
nances, these benefits must be considered along with any diminution in 
market value that the appellants might suffer. 20 
Student Comment, Zoning and Land Use, 1976 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 15.16, at 511-42; 
Glink, New Developments in Land Use and Environmental Regulation, 1983 INST. ON 
PLAN. ZON. & EMINENT DoMAIN 3-9; Sackman, When is a 'Taking' Not a 'Taking'? (Police 
Power vis-a-vis Eminent Domain), 1982 INST. ON PLAN. ZON. & EMINENT DOMAIN 201; 
Freilich, Solving the 'Taking' Equation: Making the Whole Equal to the Sum of Its Parts, 
1982 INST. ON PLAN. ZON. & EMINENT DoMAIN 301. 
15 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
16 /d. at 413. 
17 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
18 See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 V.S. 590 (1962). It is worth noting that 
Pennsylvania Coal, usually interpreted as propounding a diminution in value test, is argu-
ably viewed as intending a balancing formula. See Michaelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. 
L. REv. 1165, 1911 n.53 (1967). 
19 The local zoning ordinance at issue in Agins limited the extent of development of 
plaintiff's land to single-family units (up to 5), accessory buildings and open space uses. 447 
V.S. at 262. Such uses would only be permitted upon the submission of "a plan compatible 
with 'adjoining patterns of development and open space.' " Id. Moreover, the local au-
thorities also took into consideration its policy "to preserve the surrounding environment" 
and' 'whether the diversity of new construction will be offset by adjoining open spaces." Id. 
20 /d. at 262-63 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Agins opinion then directly 
continues: 
Although the ordinances limit development, they neither prevent the best use of 
appellants' land ... nor extinguish a fundamental attribute of ownership .... 
3
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The foregoing principles were addressed by the Supreme Judicial Court 
in MacNeil v. Town of Avon.21 The plaintiff in MacNeil owned an in-
verted "L" shaped lot with an area of 137,000 square feet and frontage of 
190 feet. 22 The property was situated in a district zoned for certain types 
of residential uses.23 Specifically, the local by-laws allowed single family, 
two-family, or duplex housing units so long as the lot was not less than 
25,000 square feet and the amount offrontage was not under 150 feet. 24 In 
addition, a special permit could be obtained for buildings containing more 
than two dwelling units if the applicant's lot contained no less than 40,000 
square feet and 200 feet of frontage. 25 The plaintiff's land satisfied the 
area requirement for multiple housing use by nearly three and one-half 
times, yet fell short ofthe frontage prerequisite by ten feet. Consequently, 
the plaintiff who wanted to build multiple housing sought a declaratory 
judgment that the 200-foot frontage stipulation could not be constitution-
ally applied to her property. 26 
The Court discerned two separate issues: (1) whether the plaintiff could 
demonstrate that the requirements of the by-law as applied were "clearly 
arbitrary, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals or general welfare;" and (2) whether the ordinance resulted in a 
taking of land without compensation.27 An affirmative answer to either 
inquiry would invalidate the by-law as applied. 
Addressing the due process issue, the Court in MacNeil found that the 
plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proof and establish that the 200-
foot frontage prerequisite for a permit to build multiple housing units was 
"unreasonable and arbitrary" under the Euclid due process standard.28 
According to the Court, "reasonable" frontage restrictions are constitu-
tional because they are consistent with the legitimate goals of zoning, 
thereby substantially relating to the public safety, health and welfare. 29 
[d. 
[Because] the appellants are free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations 
by submitting a development plan to local officials ... it cannot be said that the 
impact of general land-use regulations has denied appellants the "justice and fair-
ness" guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
For a closer examination of this case, see Beach, Agins v. the City of Tiburon: A 
Balancing Framework For "Takings" Challenges of Zoning Ordinances. 1981 DET. L. REv. 
179-201. 
21 386 Mass. 339, 435 N.E.2d 1043 (1982). 
22 [d. at 339, 435 N.E.2d at 1044. 
23 [d. 
24 [d. at 340, 435 N.E.2d at 1044. 
25 [d. 
26 [d. 
27 [d. at 340-41, 435 N.E.2d at 1045. 
28 [d. 
29 [d. at 341, 435 N.E.2d at 1045 (citing Caires v. Building Commissioner of Hingham, 
323 Mass. 589, 594, 83 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1949». 
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These goals "include lessening congestion in the streets, conservation of 
health, securing safety from fire and other dangers, provision of adequate 
light and air, prevention of overcrowding of land, and guidance of undue 
concentration of population. "30 The Court gave two explanations, consis-
tent with these objectives, for the municipality's enactment of the regula-
tion. First, multiple housing units might require greater frontage than 
single family units in order to provide access for an anticipated need for a 
larger fire fighting force.3t Second, the number of cars traveling to and 
from a residential lot and parking adjacent to its frontage may be directly 
proportional to the number of dwelling units present.32 Thus, the frontage 
prerequisite could prevent traffic problems that would hinder emergency 
vehicles.33 
The plaintiff argued that the by-law was "unreasonable and arbitrary" 
as applied because the ten-foot difference between the frontage of his 
property, 190 feet, and the by-laws requirement, 200 feet, could not affect 
the legitimate interests of the public.34 In response, the Court ruled that 
effective frontage limitations needed "lines [to] be drawn somewhere" 
and consequently a per se constitutional zoning ordinance would not be 
invalidated simply because the locus "almost meets the by-law require-
ment."35 
Concluding that a "taking" did not occur, the Court stressed that the 
plaintiff's property could be used for purposes which did not require a 
special permit, such as for single and two-family structures.36 According 
to the Court, the fact that the regulation probably resulted in a decrease in 
the market value of the land was not controlling.37 The application of a 
zoning regulation, the Court stated, is not invalid "because it prevents the 
land from being put to its most profitable use, or because the value of the 
land is substantially diminished."38 Rather, the Court noted, the appro-
priate standard is that a "regulation constitutes a taking only ifit 'deprives 
the [plaintiff's] land of all practical value to [her] or to anyone acquiring it, 
leaving them only with the burden of paying taxes on it.' "39 The MacNeil 
Court thereby adopted a strict diminution in value standard. Presumably, 
30 386 Mass. at 342, 435 N.E.2d at 1046. 
31 [d. 
32 [d. 
33 [d. at 342-43, 435 N.E.2d at 1046. 
34 [d. 
3S Id. at 343, 435 N.E.2d at 1046. 
361d. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 341, 435 N .E.2d at 1045 (quoting MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 
Mass. 635, 641, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970)). 
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the degree of diminution needed to amount to a compensable taking must 
be that which effectively removes the practical value of the land.40 
Prior to the MacNeil and Agins decisions, however, several Supreme 
Judicial Court cases took a different approach and considered the degree 
of benefit further~d by a zoning regulation as well as the severity of the 
plaintiff's property loss in resolving the taking inquiry. For example, in 
Barney and Carey v. Town of Milton 41 an ordinance limiting the plaintiff's 
land to residential uses was found unconstitutional as applied to the 
plaintiff's swamp-land. Although the Barney Court did not explicitly 
promulgate a balancing test, the essential element of its rationale was that 
the aesthetic benefits furthered by the ordinance were outweighed by the 
finding that the plaintiff had only a potential future market for the residen-
tial uses permitted.42 In Jenckes v. Building Commissioner of Brookline43 
the relevant by-law prohibited construction on any lot not adjacent to a 
private or public passageway at least 40 feet in width.44 The Court invali-
dated the by-law because it affected a vacant lot in a community in which 
several buildings already standing were inconsistent with the regulation.45 
The Court concluded: "[T]he injury to the owner of this isolated lot is so 
harsh in comparison with the trivial public benefit, if any, from application 
of the amendment to the lot, as to make that application confiscatory and 
an invalid taking of the owner's property, not justified by the police 
power."46 Again, the Supreme Judicial Court in Turnpike Realty Co. v. 
Dedham47 used balancing language in upholding the challenged applica-
tion of a by-law permitting only "woodland, grassland, wetland, agricul-
ture, horticulture or recreational use of land or water not requiring 
filling. "48 The Court explained that "[a]lthough it is clear that the 
petitioner is substantially restricted in its use of the land, such restrictions 
40 Arguably, a "taking" might occur if a certain level of the property value is still present. 
The possibility rests on the three slightly varying ways in which the MacNeil Court de-
scribes the degree of diminution in value required before a taking occurs: "all practical 
value" was used at the point where the Court initially defined the standard to be applied; "so 
much of the practical use" was presented in the section which applied the standard; and 
"such a deprivation of the practical uses" was set forth in the concluding paragraph of the 
opinion. 386 Mass. at 341,343-44,435 N.E.2d at 1045-46. The position is further supported 
by the precedential weakness of the "all practical value" method which arises from dicta in 
MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635,641,255 N.E.2d 347, 352 (1970). 
41 324 Mass. 440, 87 N.E.2d 9 (1949). 
42 /d. at 446-48, 87 N.E.2d at 13-15. 
43 341 Mass. 162, 167 N.E.2d 757 (1960). 
44 [d. at 163, 167 N.E.2d at 758. 
4S /d. at 165, 167 N.E.2d at 759. 
46 [d. at 166, 167 N.E.2d at 760. 
47 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972). 
48 /d. at 229, 284 N.E.2d 899-900 (1972). 
6
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must be balanced against the potential harm to the community from 
overdevelopment of a flood plain area.' '49 
Despite the foregoing cases, the MacNeil Court did not apply a formula 
that would compare and evaluate public benefits and private losses.5o 
Although the Court fully recognized the balancing language present in the 
Jenckes and Barney decisions, it nevertheless ruled that the wording 
therein was dicta and that those decisions in fact simply applied the 
principles of the instant case. 51 Indeed, the relevant zoning regulations in 
those cases apparently did deprive the plaintiffs of all practical use of their 
land.52 Thus, the three decisions are consistent. 
In view of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Agins, how-
ever, the possibility of using a balancing approach to resolve a "taking" 
problem should not be disregarded in cases that must evaluate the facial 
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance as opposed to its application to a 
particular tract of land.53 There are, for example, situations in which 
zoning or land use regulations which protect vital interests of the public 
on a broad scale could not feasibly be implemented if compensation were 
required, and yet their application may deprive the plaintiff of all practical 
49 [d. at 235. 284 N.E.2d at 900. The Court in Turnpike Realty also announced that 
"[a]lthough a comparison of values before and after is relevant ... it is by no means 
conclusive." [d. at 236, 284 N .E.2d at 900. For further balancing language in Massachusetts 
cases, see Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 565, 42 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1942); Gem 
Properties, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals of Milton, 341 Mass. 99, 167 N.E.2d 315 (1960); Huber. 
Zoning and Land Use, 1960 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 13.3, at 134-35. 
50 386 Mass. at 343, 435 N.E.2d at 1046. 
51 [d. at 344, 435 N.E.2d at 1046. 
52 Jenckes, 341 Mass. at 165. 167 N.E.2d at 759; Barney and Carey, 324 Mass. at 446,87 
N .E.2d at 9. Similarly in Turnpike Realty, not cited by the MacNeil Court for the purpose of 
recognizing its balancing language, the plaintiff's ability to use the locus only for woodland, 
grassland, wetland, agriculture, horticulture or recreational uses did not deprive him of "all 
beneficial uses." 362 Mass. at 229, 284 N.E.2d at 899. But see McGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals 
of Duxbury, in which similar restrictions did deny plaintiffs all practical uses. 356 Mass. 635, 
64(}'41, 255 N.E.2d 347, 351 (1970). It is important to note, however, that the McGibbon 
decision, in reaching this conclusion, did not address any constitutional problems; rather, it 
proscribed the scope of a municipality's regulatory authority under the Zoning Enabling Act, 
G.L. c. 40A. See McGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 369 Mass. 523, 525, 344 N.E.2d 
185, 186 (1976). 
The Court in MacNeil also recognized Metzger v. Brentwood, 117 N.H. 492, 501-03, 374 
A.2d 954, 957 (1977), which seemed to adopt a balancing formula. 386 Mass. at 342, 435 
N.E.2d at 1046-47. In Metzger, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire struck down a 
specific application of a local 200 foot frontage prerequisite to residential building. 117 N.H. 
at 503, 374 A.2d at 958. The MacNeil Court responded to this analogous case by explaining 
that in Metzger, the "application of the by-law would apparently have deprived the land-
owner of any practical use of the land." 386 Mass. at 344, 435 N.E.2d at 1047 (citing 
Carbonneau v. Exeter, 119 N.H. 259, 264, 401 A.2d 675, 679 (1979». 
53 The United States Supreme Court in Agins only considered the facial constitutionality 
of the zoning regulation challenged therein. 447 U.S. at 254. 
7
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value of the land. On the other hand, an ordinance might foster a legiti-
mate yet relatively trivial public interest while denying the plaintiff close 
to but not all of the practical value of his land. Thus, a rigid diminution in 
value standard applied under all circumstances could result in some 
difficult decisions. 54 
§ 15.2. Exclusionary Zoning. Exclusionary zoning as a descriptive term 
embraces certain economic and social theories. The term has been defined 
as the combination of local zoning practices that results in the closing of 
suburban housing markets to low and moderate income families where 
economic, social, or racial segregation is the real purpose or actual re-
sult.1 In 1968, a report by the Legislative Research Council of the Massa-
chusetts Senate concluded that Massachusetts zoning practices contrib-
uted to the exclusion of low and moderate income housing development in 
suburban areas, and that if existing practices remained unregulated, the 
supply of vacant land would be eliminated because communities are not 
inclined to act on their own to alleviate the problem, and courts are 
unwilling to intervene as long as the discrimination involved is economic.2 
The Anti-Snob Zoning Act (the" Act"P was enacted to deal with this 
problem. The Act provides for an expedited procedure to enable public 
agencies, limited dividend organizations, and non-profit organizations 
that propose construction of low or moderate income housing to override 
local zoning by-laws and ordinances that restrict this type of housing 
development. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Act is section 21 
which allows the local zoning board of appeals to issue a single com-
prehensive permit, thereby eliminating the need for filing an individual 
application with each local agency or official having jurisdiction over an 
aspect of the proposa1.4 Pursuant to section 21, the zoning board of 
appeals must notify any applicable local boards of the filing of an applica-
tion for a comprehensive permit for the construction of low or moderate 
income housing. 5 Within thirty days of the qualified developer's filing of a 
proposal with the board, the board is required to conduct a public hearing 
S4 NOWAK, supra note 4, at 486 (emphasis added). Ultimately, however, the decision not 
to adopt a balancing approach may make very little difference in the outcome of most cases. 
§ 15.2. 1 See 2 R. ANDERSON, American Law of Zoning § 8.02 (2d ed. 1976). 
2 MASS. SEN. REp. 1133, 1968 Session (June 1968), cited in Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. 
Housing Appeals Committee, 363 Mass. 339, 350, 294 N.E.2d 393, 403 (1973). 
3 G.L. c. 40B, §§ 20-23. See D' Agostine and Huber, Land Use Planning Law, 1964 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW § 14.1, at 164-66; Rodgers, Snob Zoning in Massachusetts, 1970 ANN. 
SURV. MASS. LAW § 18.1, at 486-89; Sherer, Snob Zoning: Development in Massachusetts 
and New Jersey, 7 HARV. J. OF LEGIS. 245, 257 (1970). 
4 G.L. c. 40B, § 21. 
S /d. 
8
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on the proposal. 6 The board must render a decision within forty days of 
the termination of the public hearing. 7 The zoning board of appeals' 
failure to conduct a public hearing or to render a decision on the proposal 
within the required time limits results in the constructive grant of the 
comprehensive permit by the board.s The constructive grant of a com-
prehensive permit may, however, be appealed by an aggrieved party if 
such an appeal is filed within twenty days of the constructive issuance of 
the permit. 9 
During the Survey year in Milton Common Associates v. Board of 
Appeals of Milton 10 the Appeals Court addressed two questions regarding 
the constructive grant of a comprehensive permit. The court was asked to 
determine when a public hearing ends for purposes of calculating whether 
a permit is deemed to have been issued through failure of the board to act, 
and what event begins the twenty-day period during which an aggrieved 
party may appeal the issuance of a constructive permit. II 
Milton Common Associates ("MCA") had applied to the Zoning Board 
of Appeals of Milton (" Board") for a comprehensive permit to build low 
and moderate income housing. Public hearings on MCA's proposal began 
on June 9, 1980 and continued over twelve sessions through December 15, 
1980. 12 At the December 15th meeting the chairman stated, "[A]t the 
outset, with the hope and expectation that we are going to finish tonight, I 
am going to schedule a deliberative session of the Board for January 21, 
1981, here at the school." 13 The chairman stated that the January meeting 
would be an open session in which the Board would conduct its delibera-
tions in public; however, no input from the public would be allowed. The 
meeting was to be open to the public only to satisfy the statutory require-
ment of the open meeting law. 14 Accordingly, no views or opinions of the 
public were allowed at this meeting; only debate among the Board mem-
bers was allowed. IS Several Board members understood that the forty-
day period for the Board's decision did not start to run until the end of this 
deliberative session. 16 
The Appeals Court, however, distinguished public hearings from de-
61d. 
71d. 
S /d. 
9 G.L. c. 40A, § 17. 
10 14 Mass. App. Ct. Ill, 436 N .E.2d 1236 (1982). 
11 /d. at 112, 436 N.E.2d at 1237-38. 
12 /d. 
13 Id. at 112, 436 N.E.2d at 1238. 
14 See G.L. c. 39, § 23B; York v. Bd. of Appeals of Newburyport, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 
410 N.E.2d 725 (1980). 
IS 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 113, 436 N.E.2d at 1238. 
161d. 
9
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liberative sessions. The court found aspects of a public hearing, spec-
ifically " 'the opportunity for interested persons to appear and express 
their views pro and con,' "17 to be lacking in the deliberative session. The 
parties present at the deliberative session had been "instructed to keep 
their lips sealed while the board pondered." 18 The court therefore held 
that' 'public hearings end when the right of interested parties to present 
information and argue is cut off." 19 
The Board argued that the deliberative session was public because 
members of the Board asked questions of MCA and they agreed to answer 
all questions posed to them. The court found that such answers on specific 
items of information could not extend the duration of the public hearings 
because there was no opportunity for either party to persuade or con-
tradict. Furthermore, the court noted, "if asking a question during the 
course of a hearing in and of itself kept open a hearing which was 
otherwise concluded, it would be a simple matter to keep hearings open 
indefinitely and to frustrate the streamlined procedure which the anti-snob 
zoning act sought to introduce."2o Thus, according to the court, the start 
ofthe forty-day period within which the Board had to make a decision was 
December 15, 1980. A permit was therefore constructively granted to 
MCA on January 26, 1981, the fortieth day having fallen on a Saturday. 
Determination of the date when the comprehensive permit is deemed to 
be constructively granted is important because aggrieved parties have to 
appeal the grant of a comprehensive permit within twenty days after the 
zoning board of appeals files notice of the granting of a permit. 21 The court 
in Milton Common Associates noted that a strict reading of the statute 
would allow a "new round of court proceeding[s] ... since the board has 
not, to this day, issued a permit, let alone filed notice with the town 
clerk. "22 The court therefore held that the triggering of the appeal period 
on a constructively granted permit was not when the zoning board of 
appeals filed notice with the town clerk, but the date on which the permit 
was deemed to have been constructively granted.23 The court stated, "In 
view of the strict time discipline which chapter 40B imposes on local 
boards and the legislative intent to effect an expedited procedure, it would 
be contrary to the statutory scheme if the date from which to count for 
17 [d. at 114-15,436 N.E.2d at 1239 (citing Willey v. Town Council of Barrington, 106 R.1. 
544, 261 A.2d 627 (1970)). 
18 /d. at 115, 436 N.E.2d at 1239. 
19 [d. 
20 [d. 
21 See Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1981 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 11.6, at 256-57. 
22 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 116, 436 N.E.2d at 1240. 
23 /d. at 120, 436 N.E.2d at 1242. 
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purposes of judicial review were other than the date on which approval 
was constructively granted. "24 
One purpose of the Act is to "streamline" local permit procedures.25 
Under a strict reading of the Act, if a zoning board of appeals failed to 
grant a certificate evidencing a constructive grant of the permit, however, 
the applicant would have to go to court to compel the "observance of the 
'expedited' procedure,"26 for if he waited, the waiting period could be 
indefinite. Clearly this interpretation is contrary to the intent of the Act, 
for the Appeals Court has stated that these time limits are to be "enforced 
with strictness. "27 The purpose of the Act is to allow localities to voice 
their opinions and have some control over low and moderate income 
housing projects, but not to undermine these projects through exclusio-
nary zoning practices or continued delay in granting permits. 
The effect of Milton Common Associates v. Board of Appeals of Milton 
is to force zoning boards of appeals to decide on applications for com-
prehensive permits and report their decisions appropriately to the town 
clerk. With delaying tactics now unavailable, a board is forced to deter-
mine whether the project is "consistent with local needs."28 Under the 
Act a developer may appeal the denial of a grant of a comprehensive 
permit by a zoning board of appeals to the State Housing Appeals Com-
mittee. 29 The Committee can override a board's decision if they find it is 
not reasonable and "consistent with local needs." 
The statutory definition of "consistent with local needs" includes gen-
erallanguage and a mathematical formula for evaluating regulations, local 
ordinances and by-laws and requirements, as they apply to a housing 
proposa1.30 The general language of the definition states that regulations 
and requirements are consistent with local needs if they are reasonable in 
view of the regional need for low and moderate income housing as consid-
ered in view of five factors: (1) the number of low income persons in the 
municipality affected; (2) the need to protect the health and safety of the 
occupants of the proposed housing or the residents of the city or town; (3) 
the promotion of better site and building design in relation to the sur-
roundings; (4) the preservation of open spaces; and (5) the application of 
such regulations and requirements as equally as possible to both sub-
24 Id. at 118-19,436 N.E.2d at 1241. 
25 See id. 
26 Id. 
27 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1053, 1054, 434 N.E.2d 672, 674 (1982). 
28 G.L. c. 40B, § 23; see Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Committee, 363 
Mass. 339, 364, 294 N.E.2d 393, 415 (1973); Huber, Land Use, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. 
LAW § 12.10, at 415-22; Comment, Land Use, 1973 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW. § 12.30, at 
454-73. 
29 G.L. c. 40B, § 23. 
30 G.L. c. 40B, § 20. 
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sidized and non-subsidized housing. The mathematical formula incorpo-
rated into the definition provides three exceptions to the requirements of 
the general language. Satisfaction of anyone of these three exceptions 
provides conclusive evidence that the community has met its low and 
moderate income housing obligation. The three exceptions are: (1) where 
low or moderate income housing exists in excess of ten percent of the 
housing units reported in the latest decennial census of the city or town; 
(2) where low or moderate income housing exists on sites comprising 
one-and-one-half percent or more of the total land area zoned for com-
mercial, residential or industrial use; and (3) where the application before 
the board would result in the commencement of construction during that 
calendar year of low or moderate income housing on sites comprising 
more than three-tenths of one percent of land zoned for commercial, 
residential or industrial uses in the community or on ten acres of such 
land, whichever is greater. In computing the land area of a community, 
land owned by the United States, the state or any political subdivision 
must be excluded from the total land area.31 
In a second Survey year decision concerning the comprehensive permit 
process under the Act, Zoning Board of Appeals of Wellesley v. Housing 
Appeals Committee,32 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a decision of 
the Wellesley Zoning Board of Appeals ("Board") denying the grant of a 
comprehensive permit was not reasonable and consistent with local 
needs. 33 In this case Cedar Street Associates ("CSA") applied for and 
was granted a comprehensive permit under sections 20-23 of chapter 40B 
on condition that CSA would apportion at least eighty percent of the units 
for the elderly as well as obtain the necessary financing. CSA obtained a 
loan from the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency ("MHFA") with 
conditions that the development provide only ten rent subsidized units for 
the elderly, eight rent subsidized units for families and eighteen units for 
rental at market rates. The Board, after being notified ofthese conditions, 
required CSA to file another application for a comprehensive permit, 
which the Board subsequently denied. 34 The reasons for the denial were: 
"the proposed site was not equipped to provide the facilities necessary for 
a high density population; ... the project was detrimental to the health 
and safety of the anticipated occupants and their neighbors; and ... the 
planning objections incidental to the development outweighed the need 
for low or moderate income housing. "35 
CSA appealed the Board's decision to the Housing Appeals Committee 
31 G.L. c. 40B, § 20. 
32 385 Mass. 651,433 N.E.2d 873 (1982). 
33 Id. at 652, 433 N.E.2d at 875. 
34 [d. at 653, 433 N.E.2d at 875. 
35 Id. 
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("HAC") pursuant to section 22 of chapter 40B, claiming that the deci-
sion was not reasonable and consistent with local needs. The Board 
conceded that Wellesley had not met its minimum housing obligation 
under the mathematical formula and that there was an absolute need for 
more apartments for low and moderate income individuals.36 The Board, 
however, moved to dismiss the appeal to HAC on the ground that HAC 
lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. 37 HAC denied the Board's 
motion, ruling that the project was low or moderate income housing under 
section 20 of chapter 40B because it was financed by the MHF A. 38 HAC 
then held the Board's decision was not reasonable and consistent with 
local needs because the same objections were raised and discussed by the 
Board when granting the first comprehensive permit. HAC directed the 
Board to grant the comprehensive permit; the Board appealed to the 
superior court. The superior court held in favor of the HAC and the Board 
then appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The Supreme Judicial Court was confronted with two issues: (1) 
whether a development financed by MHF A, which includes units rented 
at fair market value, is low or moderate income housing within the 
definition provided in section 20 of chapter 40B; and (2) whether the 
decision of HAC was supported by substantial evidence. The Court, in 
deciding whether a development financed by the MFHA which included 
units rented at market rates was low or moderate income housing, exam-
ined the regulations of the Department of Community Affairs ("DCA") 
promulgated under the statute. These regulations provide that "[l]ow or 
moderate income housing shall include without limitation units of housing 
constructed under ... MHFA Mortgage Loans."39 The Court noted that 
these administrative regulations were not binding on the Court, but de-
cided to give "great weight to a 'reasonable construction of a regulatory 
statute adopted by the agency charged with [its] enforcement.' "40 The 
Court examined the legislative history behind the establishment of the 
MHF A and found that its purpose was "to promote the construction of 
low or moderate income housing projects which also include units rented 
at fair market value ... [so that] low income families will be allowed to 
live in decent apartments, without identification, in close proximity to 
families of differing economic and social levels. "41 The Court found 
DCA's regulation, which included MHFA financed projects within the 
36 Id. at 658, 433 N.E.2d at 877. 
37 Id. at 653, 433 N.E.2d at 875. 
3" /d. 
39 MASS. ADMIN. CODE tit. 760, § 30(b)(2)(i)(2). 
40 385 Mass. at 654, 433 N.E.2d at 876 (citing School Committee of Springfield v. Bd. of 
Educ., 362 Mass 417, 441 n.22, 287 N.E.2d 438, 455 n.22 (1972)). 
41 Id. at 655, 438 N.E.2d at 876. 
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definition of low and moderate income housing, to be reasonable and 
consistent with the statute.42 Thus, the Court found that HAC had cor-
rectly exercised jurisdiction over the CSA development project.43 
Turning to the second issue, the Court addressed the Board's claim 
under chapter 30A of the General Laws that HAC's decision ordering 
issuance of a comprehensive permit was unsupported by substantial evi-
dence.44 According to the Court, HAC can overturn a board's decision if 
that decision is not reasonable and consistent with local needs. In making 
this determination, HAC must decide whether the need for low or moder-
ate income housing outweighs valid planning objections to the proposal 
such as health, site, design, and space.45 Furthermore, HAC's decision 
must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence.46 The Court 
stated that "[s]ubstantial evidence is such evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,"47 and "a court may 
not displace an administrative board's choice between two fairly conflict-
ing views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different 
choice had the matter been before it de novo. "48 The Court, citing HAC's 
reliance on the Board's prior granting of the comprehensive permit and 
HAC's inspection of the site, held that HAC's decision was supported by 
substantial evidence, and that HAC had applied the correct standard 
when it balanced the need for low and moderate income housing against 
the planning board's objections to the application.49 
This opinion by the Supreme Judicial Court extends the authority of the 
HAC by permitting its reach to extend to developments which include 
both low and moderate income housing and units rented at market rates. 
This decision in effect affirms HAC's policy not only to provide housing 
for low or moderate income individuals, but also to provide housing which 
will integrate them into the community by enabling them to live in decent 
housing without identification. In addition, the decision also addresses 
HAC's concern over towns allowing low or moderate income housing 
only when it is housing for the elderly. The intent of the Anti-Snob Zoning 
Act was not to provide housing only for the elderly but for low and 
moderate income families as well. If towns are allowed to provide low and 
42 [d. 
43 [d. 
44 See G.L. c. 30A, § 14; and G.L. c. 40B, § 22. 
45 385 Mass. at 656, 433 N.E.2d at 877 (citing Bd. of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing 
Appeals Committee, 363 Mas.s. 339, 294 N.E.2d 393 (1973)). 
46 [d. 
47 [d. at 657, 433 N.E.2d at 877 (citing G.L. c. 30A, § 1(6». 
48 [d. (citing Labor Relations Commission v. University Hosp. Inc., 359 Mass. 516, 269 
N.E.2d 682 (1977). 
49 385 Mass. at 658-59, 433 N .E.2d at 878. 
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moderate income housing only for the elderly, then they are still in 
essence practicing exclusionary zoning. 
To further understand the principles behind exclusionary zoning, a look 
at a New Jersey case decided during the Survey year is helpful. Southern 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel ("Mount Laurel 
II' ')50 is a reaffirmation and modification of an earlier decision by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, Southern Burlington County NAACP v. 
Township of Mount Laurel ("Mount Laurel 1").51 Mount Laurel II exhib-
its the problems of judicially adopted anti-snob zoning devices. The six 
cases comprising Mount Laurel II "[a]ll involve questions arising from 
the Mount Laurel doctrine." ... "They demonstrate the need to put 
some steel into that doctrine. The deficiencies in its application range 
from uncertainty and inconsistency at the trial level to inflexible review 
criteria at the appellate level." 52 The New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Laurel II, however, recited that the basis behind Mount Laurel I was 
correct; the state controls the use of all the land therein, and in exercising 
such control it cannot favor the rich over the pOOr.53 
The clarity of the constitutional obligation is seen most simply by imagining 
what this state could be like were this claim never to be recognized and 
enforced: poor people forever zoned out of substantial areas of the state, not 
because housing could not be built for them but because they are not 
wanted; poor people forced to live in urban slums forever, not because 
suburbia, developing rural areas, fully developed residential sections, 
seashore resorts, and other attractive locations could not accommodate 
them, but simply because they are not wanted. It is a vision not only at 
variance with the requirement that the zoning power be used for the general 
welfare but with all concepts of fundamental fairness and decency that 
underpin many constitutional obligations. 54 
After reaffirming the basic principles of the "Mount Laurel doctrine," 
the court in Mount Laurel II changed the administrative aspects of Mount 
Laurel I. The court provided for three judges to hear all litigation brought 
under the Mount Laurel doctrine, providing for uniform decisions and 
thereby simplifying the scope of litigation as well as increasing the speed 
of the trials. 55 This is the problem that Massachusetts attempted to ad-
50 92 N.J. 158,456 A.2d 390 (1982). This action is a collection of six separate cases all 
involving the same or similar issues. 
51 67 N.J. 151,336 A.2d 713 (1975); see Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1975 ANN. SURV. 
MASS. LAW § 19.1, at 515, for a discussion of Mount Laurell. 
52 92 N.J. at 198-99,456 A.2d at 410. 
53 Id. at 209, 456 A.2d at 415. 
54 [d. This concern of the New Jersey court expresses the unstated concern of MHFA and 
HAC in theBd. of Appeals of Wellesley case (see supra text accompanying notes 32-49). Not 
only the elderly but the poor as well should be allowed to live in suburbia; neither group 
should be forced to live in areas comparable to Newark and Camden. See id. at 215 n.5, 456 
A.2d at 415 n.5. 
55 92 N.J. at 216, 253, 352, 456 A.2d at 419, 439, 490. 
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dress through the establishment of HAC and the structure of a process 
with mandatory time limits to be strictly enforced, a system and intent 
explained in Milton Common Associates v. Board of Appeals of Milton 56 
and Massachusetts Bread Co., Inc. v. Brice. 57 Also, Mount Laurel II 
cited the use of New Jersey's State Department Guide Plan to provide an 
objective basis for determining if a town has met its obligation for low and 
moderate income housing or if such an obligation should be imposed on a 
town.58 
Mount Laurel II goes beyond the Massachusetts Anti-Snob Zoning Act 
in that it recognizes not only the need to remove local zoning restrictions, 
but also to force localities to provide "a realistic opportunity for such 
housing" to be built.59 The New Jersey Supreme Court places an affirma-
tive obligation on the municipality to help developers obtain federal and 
state housing subsidies. A municipality must pass a "resolution of need" 
if one is required or grant a tax abatement if such action will allow a 
developer to receive a federal grant. 60 The New Jersey court also requires 
municipalities not meeting their low and moderate income housing obliga-
tions to establish inclusionary zoning devices, specifically: incentive zon-
ing;61 mandatory set-asides;62 zoning for mobile homes;63 and providing 
least cost housing.64 
56 14 Mass. App. Ct. 111,436 N.E.2d 1236 (1982). See supra notes 1(}'31 and accompany-
ing text. 
57 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1053,434 N.E.2d 672 (1982). See supra note 27 and accompanying 
text. 
58 This requirement is tantamount to the Massachusetts test of "consistent with local 
needs." See supra text at notes 3(}'31. Both tests require that low and moderate income 
housing cannot be forced upon a municipality if that municipality has made an effort to 
provide its fair share of low and moderate income housing. New Jersey, like Massachusetts, 
now takes a regional approach to the low income housing problem instead of limiting its 
consideration to individual towns. See generally G.L. c. 40B, §§ 1-29. 
59 92 N.J. at 264, 456 A.2d at 444. 
60 [d. (referring to the state housing subsidy program requiring a resolution of need, N.J. 
STAT. ANN. 55, 145-6(b), and the Federal Community Development Block Grant Program, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5320 (1982 Supp.). 
61 92 N.J. at 266, 456 A.2d at 445. Incentive zoning is a technique where developers are 
permitted density bonuses. A developer can increase the permitted density of a project, 
allowing for savings in construction and land costs. These savings are to be passed on to the 
purchasers theoretically allowing persons of low or moderate income housing to purchase 
the homes. See Fox & Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost 
Housing, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1015, 106(}'62 (1976). 
62 92 N .J. at 267, 456 A. 2d at 446. Mandatory set-asides are devices to require a developer 
to establish a certain percent of the development to be reserved for low and moderate 
income housing. See Fox & Davis, supra note 61, at 1065-66. 
63 92 N.J. at 274, 456 A.2d at 450. Zoning for mobile homes is recognized by the court as 
an affordable alternative for low income individuals in lieu of the purchase of more costly 
housing or paying high rents. Thus, municipalities in New Jersey will no longer be permitted 
to ban mobile homes. 
64 92 N.J. at 277-78, 456 A.2d at 451. Least cost housing is defined by the courts as "the 
16
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Massachusetts does not require affirmative steps to provide low income 
housing, but if cases similar to Zoning Board of Appeals of Wellesley v. 
Housing Appeals Committee 65 continue to appear, the Massachusetts 
courts may seek to require that affirmative steps be taken by Massachu-
setts cities and towns. Since the enactment of the Anti-Snob Zoning Act 
in Massachusetts in 1969, only twenty-five percent of the 351 cities and 
towns in Massachusetts have utilized the comprehensive permit process, 
and of the 14,834 housing units applied for, only 3,462 have been built, 
and of these 3,462 units, forty percent are for elderly housing, thirty-six 
percent are for family housing and twenty-four percent are for mixed 
elderly and family housing.66 Although the Act has facilitated the con-
struction of some low and moderate income housing, the efforts needed to 
get a comprehensive permit and carry a project through to construction 
have often been difficult.67 The Act thus has provided an adequate start-
ing point in addressing the severe shortage of low and moderate income 
housing in the state, but HAC and the courts are displeased with its 
limited effectiveness. The only way to ensure that the intent ofthe Act, to 
provide housing for low and moderate income individuals, is fulfilled may 
be to adopt an approach similar to that of New Jersey's affirmative 
requirements as described in Mount Laurel II. 
§ 15.3. Zoning - Challenging Constructive Approval of a Variance. An 
applicant for a variance is protected under the Massachusetts Zoning Act 
(the "Act") from the inaction of a permit granting authority by the 
following provision of section 15: 
The decision of the board shall be made within seventy-five days after the 
date of the filing of an appeal, application or petition .... Failure by the 
board to act within said seventy-five days shall be deemed to be the grant of 
the relief, application or petition sought, subject to an applicable judicial 
appeal as provided for in this chapter. 1 
The granting of an application under such conditions has come to be 
known as "constructive" approva1. 2 As section 5 clearly indicates, a 
least expensive housing that builders can provide after removal by the municipality of all 
excessive restrictions and exactions and after thorough use by a municipality of all affirma-
tive devices that might lower costs." !d. The removal of restrictions includes only those 
"not essential for safety and health." Id. 
65 385 Mass. 651, 433 N.E.2d 873 (1982). See supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text. 
66 Reed, Tilting at Windmills: The Massachusetts Low and Moderate Income Housing 
Act, 4 WEST, N.E. L. REv. 105, 125 (1982) (citing G. RUBEN & c. WILLIAMS, COMPREHEN-
SIVE PERMITS FOR HOUSING LOWER INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN MASSACHUSETTS. (Citi-
zens Housing and Planning Associates Inc. (Dec. 1979)). 
67 G. RUBEN & C. WILLIAMS, supra note 66, at 10. 
§ 15.3. 1 G.L. c. 40A, § 15. 
2 Most of the litigation involving constructive approval in the land use area has come from 
cases involving subdivision control. G.L. c. 41, § 81U provides, in pertinent part: 
Failure of the planning board either to take final action or to file with the city or town 
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constructively granted variance may be challenged pursuant to the proce-
dures described in the Act. Section 17 of the Act governs such judicial 
review, and states in pertinent part: 
Any person aggrieved by a decision of the board of appeals or any special 
permit granting authority ... may appeal ... by bringing an action within 
twenty days after the decision has been filed in the office of the city or town 
clerk. 3 
The wording of section 17, however, does not specifically address judicial 
review of constructive approval. 4 Taken literally, section 17 authorizes 
only the running of the appeals period after a decision is filed. Thus, a 
significant dilemma arises concerning the appropriate time for challenging 
constructive approval of a variance. The question arises whether the 
appeals period runs from the date relief is constructively granted5 or from 
an indeterminate later date upon which a decision is finally filed. The 
Appeals Court examined this issue during the Survey year. In Noe v. 
Board of Appeals of Hingham 6 a majority of the court held that the 
twenty-day period for filing an appeal under section 17 of the Act does not 
begin to run for an adjoining landowner challenging constructive approval 
of a variance until a decision has been filed with the town clerk. 7 
In Noe, the owners of the lot in question applied to the Hingham Board 
of Appeals ("Board") fot a variance in order to avoid the lo€al zoning 
law's side yard requirements.s More than twenty days following the date 
upon which the Board's inaction ripened into a constructive grant, the 
clerk a certificate of such action regarding a [subdivision) plan submitted by an 
applicant within sixty days after each submission ... shall be deemed to be an 
approval thereof. 
3 G.L. c. 40A, § 17. This section applies equally to constructive approval of a special 
permit under G.L. c. 40A, § 9. 
4 In contrast, the subdivision control law provides that if a plan is constructively ap-
proved: 
[T)he city or town clerk shall, after the expiration of twenty days without notice of 
appeal ... , issue a certificate stating the date of the submission of the plan for 
approval, the fact that the planning board failed to take final action and that the 
approval resulting from such failure has become final. 
G.L. c. 41, § 81V. See supra note 2. Section 8IBB of the same chapter further declares: 
Any person ... aggrieved by the failure of [a planning board) to take final action 
concerning [a subdivision plan) within the required time may appeal ... provided, 
that such appeal is entered ... within twenty days after the expiration of the required 
time as aforesaid . . . . 
5 Apparently, this was the interpretation given in one well respected analysis of com-
monwealth zoning law. Se'e Healy, Massachusetts Zoning Practice Under the Amended 
Enabling Act, 64 MAss. L. REv. 149, 164 (1979). 
6 13 Mass. App. Ct. 103, 430 N.E.2d 853 (1982). 
7 [d. at 104, 430 N.E.2d at 854. 
8 [d. at 105, 430 N.E.2d at 854-55. 
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plaintiff, an adjoining landowner, brought suit in the superior court seek-
ing an order instructing the Board to file a decision and it ruling against the 
validity of any constructively approved variance. 9 A few days after the 
commencement of this action, the Board filed a decision expressly grant-
ing the variance.lO Within twenty days thereafter, the plaintiff's com-
plaint was amended, seeking a reversal of the Board's decision. lI The 
superior court, however, granted the owners' subsequent motion to dis-
miss the complaint as being "untimely." 12 
In reversing the judgment of the superior court, the Appeals Court first 
distinguished analogous cases that involved only an owner and the munic-
ipality from the case before it, which also concerned the rights of an 
aggrieved third person,13 In the former type of case, the court noted, a 
board is obligated to file a decision within the seventy-five day period of 
section 15; "otherwise the applicant prevails by default."14 In the latter 
situation, however, the court determined that the ability of an adjoining 
landowner to obtain judicial review of a constructively granted variance, 
or of a later filed decision expressly granting the variance, should not 
depend upon whether the aggrieved party' 'fails to run off to the appropri-
ate court house within twenty days of the date of the constructive 
grant." 15 
Second, the Appeals Court emphasized the importance of a precise 
time at which the appeals period under section 17 would commence. 16 
The court noted that this consideration had been a primary factor in the 
disposition Of Building Inspector of Attleboro v. Attleboro Landfill, 
Inc.,17 in which the Supreme Judicial Court, dealing with constructive 
9 [d. The plaintiff also sought an injunction which was denied for failure to first pursue 
various forms of administrative relief. [d. at 105 n.4, 430 N.E.2d at 855 n.4. As the court 
noted, such relief is discussed in Neuhaus v. Building Inspector of Marlboro, 1981 Mass. 
App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 161, 415 N.E.2d 235; 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 105 n.4, 430 N.E.2d at 855 n.4. 
10 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 105, 430 N.E.2d at 855. 
11/d. 
12 /d. At this juncture the case presented a rather unusual procedural problem. Briefly, 
there had been some confusion as to whether the aforesaid motion shoUld be handled as one 
for summary judgment pursuant to MASS. R. CIv. P. 56, or one to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction pursuant to MAss. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) or 12(h)(3). /d. at 105 nn. 5-6,430 N.E.2d 
at 855 nn. 5-6. The court concluded that the latter was more appropriate and that the lower 
court had erred in reaching the merits of a case it had ordered dismissed. [d. at 105 n.6, 430 
N.E.2d at 855 n.6. Prospective litigants would be advised to check the record in detail. 
13 [d. at 108, 430 N.E.2d at 856. 
14 [d. at 107,430 N.E.2d at 856 (quoting Rinaudo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Plymouth, 
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1653, 421 N.E.2d 439.) 
15 /d. at 108, 430 N.E.2d at 856. 
16/d' 
17 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1653,423 N.E.2d 1009. 
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approval of special permits under section 9 of the Act, stated that' 'unless 
the board's decision is filed with the clerk, there would be no commence-
ment of the statutory time within which appeals may be taken."18 
Finally, the court in Noe reasoned that the relevant statutory language 
placed particular emphasis upon the filing of a decision with the town or 
city clerk. 19 The court referred to the notice provisions of section 15 
which require that an applicant and other affected parties20 be informed 
that "appeals, if any, shall be made pursuant to section seventeen and 
shall be filed within twenty days after the date of filing such notice in the 
office of the city or town clerk." 2 I In addition, the court noted that section 
17, which confers appellate jurisdiction under the Act, requires that such 
an appeal be made "within twenty days after the decision has been filed in 
the office of the city or town clerk"22 and further provides that "there 
shall be attached to the complaint a copy of the decision appealed from, 
bearing the date of filing thereof, certified by the city or town clerk with 
whom the decision was filed. "23 
The root of the problem in this case is the lack of a definitive procedure 
dealing specifically with constructive approval under the Act. 24 The un-
derlying issue, therefore, becomes whose rights, those of the applicant or 
those of the adjoining landowner, should prevail given the statutory 
ambiguity. The Appeals Court, consistent with the historical policy to 
favor appeals by adjoining landowners,2s is ultimately willing to preserve 
18 [d. at 1655, 1656, 423 N.E.2d at 101(}'I1, quoted in 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 108, 430 
N.E.2d at 857. The dissent found the court's analysis of Attleboro Landfill insufficient. 13 
Mass. App. Ct. at 111,430 N.E.2d at 858 (Dreben, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, 
an applicant for a variance is unable to rely upon board inaction under the majority's 
holding, while the adjoining landowner is given "what may be an unlimited period oftime to 
cloud the rights of a landowner to use his land . . . . Such an unlimited appeal period is 
contrary to our appellate practice generally, ... and to the legislative mandate in similar 
matters, G.L. c. 41, § 8IU." [d. Justice Dreben would have ruled that the twenty day 
appeals period begins to run immediately upon the date where inaction has matured into a 
constructive approval so long as the aggrieved person had notice of the original application 
as required by G.L. c. 41A, § II. [d. at 112, 430 N.E.2d at 859. 
19 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 104, 430 N.E.2d at 857. 
20 G.L. c. 40A, § II lists those individuals who are entitled to such notice as "the 
petitioner, abutters, owners of land directly opposite on any private or public street or way, 
and abutters to the abutters within three hundred feet of the property line of the petitioner. " 
21 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 109, 430 N.E.2d at 857 (quoting G.L. c. 4OA, § 15). 
22 [d. (quoting G.L. c. 40A, § 17). 
23 /d. 
24 The court in Noe recognized that the statutes dealing with constructive approval of 
variances (and special permits) were hastily added to the Zoning Act "without recognizing 
the need for a change in § 17 which would provide alternative appeal periods comparable to 
those in c. 41, § 8IBB." [d. at 109 n.IO, 430 N.E.2d at 857 n.IO. See, e.g., 1975 Senate 
Journal at 2211, 2215; 1975 House Journal at 2939, 2993, 3037-38. 
25 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §§ 134.02-134.03, at 38-41. 
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the right of appeal under certain circumstances. Perhaps the court im-
plicitly indicated this in Noe when it described the twenty-day appeals 
period as being "precariously extrapolated" from section 17.26 It would 
seem, however, that the technical requirements of filing which permeate 
section 17 are no less "extrapolated." 
Given the increase in the number of cases involving constructive ap-
proval under the Zoning Act,27 a statutory change that would protect an 
applicant for a variance from what could be an unlimited appeals period 
may be in order.28 Such a change might allow the landowner to do some 
act amounting to a recording of the constructively approved variance with 
the city or town clerk.29 The appeals period would then run from the date 
of this recording, which under the amendment would be synonymous to 
filing a decision under sections 15 and 17. This proposed change would 
require the landowner to inform those entitled to notice of the original 
application under section 11 of the Act about the status of the application 
and the running of the appeals period. Such a resolution would also help 
to alleviate any title problems that may occur if any of the "bundle of 
rights" is exchanged between the date of the constructive grant and the 
running of the appeals period. This self-help approach seems most desira-
ble because the applicant, being the one most anxious to have the relief 
granted, is usually in the best position to pursue such measures.30 
Later during the Survey year the Appeals Court addressed a closely 
related matter in Girard v. Board of Appeals of Easton. 31 In that case, the 
owners of two neighboring parcels of land sought, inter alia, a variance 
from the lot size requirements of the applicable Easton by-law in order to 
26 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 106 n.7, 430 N.E.2d at 856 n.7. 
27 See, e.g., Pasqualino v. Bd. of Appeals of Wareham, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 989, 440 
N.E.2d 523 (1982); Shea v. Bd. of Aldermen of Chicopee, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1046, 434 
N.E.2d 214 (1982). 
2H The dissent in Noe emphasizes this problem. See supra note 18. 
29 This is quite different from the protection currently afforded by section 81 V of the 
Subdivision Control Law (see supra note 4) which merely keeps the responsibility to record 
an approval in the hands of the authorities and may leave the applicant in the position of 
having to pursue the extraordinary and often illusive relief of a writ of mandamus. G.L. c. 
41, § 81V. See supra notes 2 and 3. 
30 In contrast to the Subdivision Control Law (see G.L. c. 41, § 81W) the Zoning Act does 
not provide for the amendment or rescission of a variance or special permit once it is 
approved. Although a regularly granted variance or special permit "may impose conditions, 
safeguards and limitations" of time and use (G.L. c. 40A, § 10 and § 9, respectively) no such 
condition could attach to a constructively granted variance or special permit. Thus, the risk 
of permanent damage to land or community is an unfortunate consequence of constructive 
approval which nevertheless must be balanced against the need to protect both the land-
owner from the unreasonable loss of tht: use of his land and the community in general from 
administrative folly. 
31 14 Mass. App. Ct. 334, 439 N.E.2d 308 (1982). 
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construct a single-family house.32 The Board, however, failed to file a 
decision within the seventy-five day statutory period, thereby construc-
tively approving the variance.33 The plaintiff appealed the constructive 
grant under section 17 of the Act before any decision was filed with the 
town clerk.34 In N oe, the Appeals Court intentionally postponed a deter-
mination of the proper time and method of obtaining judicial review when 
a board has yet to file any decision, before or after the seventy-five days, 
with the town or city clerk.3s The court in Girard resolved the issue by 
holding that the period before a decision is filed is a suitable time to 
challenge a constructively granted variance under section 17.36 The 
court's rationale focused on the principle that "when statutes fix a certain 
time after a procedural event for taking action, the action may be taken 
before the event." 37 The opinion also explained that such action is not 
prejudicial to the defendant when, as was the case in Girard, the facts 
upon which the action is based are generally known. 38 Finally, the court 
pronounced: •• [I]t is a general policy of the law to prevent loss of valuable 
rights . . . because [something] was done too soon." 39 Taken together, 
the Noe and Girard decisions make it clear that a constructively granted 
variance may be challenged by an aggrieved third party other than the 
municipality at any time between its becoming effective and twenty days 
after a decision has been filed with the town or city clerk. 
§ 15.4. Zoning Act - Prior Nonconforming Use - Challenge to Building 
Permit - Statute of Limitations. The Zoning Act (the" Act") permits 
lawfully established uses of real property that come in conflict with 
subsequently passed zoning ordinances to continue.! The Act's protec-
tion of these prior nonconforming uses ceases, however, if there is a 
"change or substantial extension of such use[s]."2 During the Survey year 
in Cape Resort Hotels Inc. v. Alcoholic Licensing Board of Falmouth,3 
the Supreme Judicial Court used this latter clause to remove the status of 
a resort hotel as a valid prior nonconforming use. Nevertheless, the Court 
3Z /d. at 335, 439 N.E.2d at 309. 
33 [d. at 337, 439 N.E.2d at 310. 
34 [d. 
35 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 110, 430 N.E.2d at 857. 
36 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 337-38, 439 N.E.2d at 311. 
37/d. (citing Tanzilli v. Cassassa, 324 Mass. 113,85 N.E.2d 220 (1949». 
38 /d. at 338, 439 N .E.2d at 311. 
39 /d. (quoting Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 374 Mass. 230, 372 
N .E.2d 1254 (1978». 
§ 15.4. I O.L. c. 40A, § 6. 
2 [d. 
3 385 Mass. 205, 431 N.E.2d 213 (1982). 
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also held that a significant portion of the hotel premises, which had been 
developed under a building permit more than six years prior to the filing of 
suit, was immune from challenge under the statute of limitations set forth 
in section 7 of the Act.4 
The facility at issue in Cape Resort was situated in a residential district 
and had functioned as a protected nonconforming use since 1926.5 In 1926 
the hotel was comprised of a dining room, kitchen, lobby, reading area, 
sitting room, porch, and guest rooms.6 The hotel had no separate bar 
directly serving patrons but did serve alcoholic beverages in its dining 
room. 7 A standard entertainment program included a pianist or trio at 
dinner followed by card games or movies ordinarily lasting until about ten 
p.m.s From time to time a dance or concert attracting the general public 
was featured that would conclude at about one a.m.9 The Court described 
the nonconforming use as it existed in 1926 as a "traditional, full service 
summer resort hotel for mostly middle aged and older clientele." 1 0 
From about the mid-1950's until the late 1970' s the resort hotel gradu-
ally developed into a modern entertainment complex with three separate 
bar rooms, each having distinct entertainment offerings.ll The "pub," 
formerly the reading room, had a "jukebox," games and live music during 
the evenings; the "show lounge," once guest room space, offered live 
entertainment, including musical groups and dancing; and the "disco," 
occupying the space previously used for the dining room, featured a large 
dance floor accompanied by lighting displays and sound producing 
equipment. 12 Furthermore, noise and parking problems had developed, 
and, consequently, abutters to the facility were occasionally disturbed 
until two or three a.m.B 
In ruling upon the nonconforming use status of the resort hotel, the 
4 !d. at 217, 431 N.E.2d at 220. The relevant portion of O.L. c. 40A, § 7 provides: 
[Ilf real property has been used in accordance with the terms of the original building 
permit ... no action, criminal or civil, the effect or purpose of which is to compel the 
abandonment, limitation or modification of the use allowed by said permit or the 
removal, alteration or relocation of any structure erected in reliance upon said permit 
by reason of any alleged violation of the provisions of this chapter, or of any 
ordinance or by-law adopted thereunder, shall be maintained, unless such action, suit 
or proceeding is commenced ... within six years next after the alleged violation of 
law. 
s 385 Mass. at 211, 431 N.E.2d at 217. 
6 Id. at 208, 431 N.E.2d at 215. 
7 !d. 
S !d. at 208-09, 431 N.E.2d at 215-16. 
9 !d. at 209, 431 N.E.2d at 216. 
10 Id. at 208, 431 N.E.2d at 215. 
II !d. at 209, 210, 431 N.E.2d at 216. 
12 Id. 
13 !d. at 211, 431 N.E.2d at 217. 
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Supreme Judicial Court relied upon the three-prong inquiry set forth in 
Bridgewater v. Chuckran: 14 "(1) whether the use reftects the 'nature and 
purpose' ofthe use prevailing when the zoning by-law took effect ... ,(2) 
whether there is a difference in the quality or character, as well as the 
degree of use and ... (3) whether the current use is 'different in kind in its 
effect on the neighborhood.' "15 Bridgewater further places on the land-
owner engaging in the nonconforming use the burden of demonstrating 
that under the foregoing standards, a change or substantial extension in 
use does not exist. 16 The Cape Resort Court applied the Bridgewater 
inquiries in seriatum. The present use of the property, according to the 
Court, did not reftect the nature and purpose of the original nonconform-
ing use,17 Rather, the Court found that the major functioning of the hotel 
had "changed dramatically" from providing room and board to offering 
extensive entertainment facilities geared to appeal to a younger and larger 
clientele. 18 The Court next concluded that the present hotel facilities 
differed from the 1926 version in quality, character and degree of use. 19 
The Court referred to the transformation of the uses of each of the hotel 
rooms and the servicing of a younger clientele to support this conclu-
sion.20 In addition, the Court emphasized that, unlike the 1926 operation, 
a substantial majority ofthe hotel's revenues were being obtained through 
the sale of alcohol,21 Moreover, the Court observed, the previous modes 
of entertainment, such as cards and movies, were replaced by nightclub 
activity.22 To complete the Bridgewater analysis, the Court found that the 
current uses of the property affected the neighborhood in a greatly differ-
ent manner than the uses prevalent in 1926.23 Most significant was the 
evolved ability of the nightclubs to provide service for more than 800 
people at a time, thus resulting in traffic and noise problems that created a 
disturbance to the community,24 Based upon these conclusions, the Cape 
Resort Court revoked the status of the hotel facility as a protected non-
conforming use. 25 
Despite the Court's ruling revoking the hotel's protection as a valid 
nonconforming use, the hotel owners were nevertheless able to maintain 
the operation of their "show lounge," which had been constructed under 
14 351 Mass. 20, 217 N.E.2d 726 (1966). 
15 /d. at 23, 217 N.E.2d at 727-28. 
16 ld. at 24, 217 N.E.2d at 728. 
17 385 Mass. at 212, 431 N.E.2d at 217. 
181d. at 212-13, 431 N.E.2d at 217-18. 
19 Id. at 213, 431 N.E.2d at 218. 
20 ld. 
21 Id. at 214, 431 N.E.2d at 218. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 216, 431 N.E.2d at 219. 
24 /d. 
25 /d. 
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a 1961 building permit. 26 The Act provides that an action to restrict the 
uses that are allowed by a building permit must be initiated within six 
years after the alleged violation of law began.27 Because the improve-
ments constructed under the 1961 permit were completed more than six 
years prior to the filing of suit, and the "show lounge" was being "used in 
accordance with the terms of the original building permit," the statute of 
limitations contained in section 7 of the Act applied. 28 The Court rejected 
the argument that the term "real property" in section 7 connotes "raw 
land" and that, therefore, the words "original building permit" in that 
by-law refer only to a permit allowing the construction of an independent 
structure.29 Such an interpretation would mean that "no alterations of or 
additions to existing buildings, even those undertaken in accordance with 
properly issued building permits, would be protected by the section 7 
statute of limitations." 30 This would be contrary to the Legislature's 
intent to set a time after which the issuance of a building permit could not 
be challenged as being contrary to zoning law. 31 
The hotel owners also presented three separate arguments in an attempt 
to block the effect of the loss of valid nonconforming use status. First, the 
hotel owners claimed that the authority to maintain the current uses of the 
hotel should be implied by the issuance of a 1969 variance for a parking 
lot. 32 The Court found this approach to be insufficient since the operation 
of the hotel facilities was simply not at issue when the local board 
approved the 1969 variance.33 
Second, the hotel owners claimed that the theories of laches and estop-
pel provided defenses to the enforcement of nonconforming use related 
by-laws.34 In rejecting this notion, the Cape Resort Court described the 
distinguishing characteristics of its decision in Chilson v. Zoning Board of 
Appeals of Attleboro,35 which seemingly applied the doctrine oflaches. In 
Chilson the town building inspector had expressly approved the trans-
ference of a nonconforming use from one building to another. 36 This 
26 [d. at 217, 431 N.E.2d at 220. 
27 See supra note 3 (relevant text of section 7). 
28 [d. at 219, 431 N.E.2d at 221. 
29 [d. at 218, 431 N.E.2d at 220. 
30 [d. 
31 /d. at 218, 431 N .E.2d at 220-21. An outdoor porch, enclosed in 1956, was not protected 
under section 7 because the hotel owners failed to demonstrate that the improvement was 
used in accordance with the permit authorizing its construction. !d. at 219, 431 N.E.2d at 
221. 
32 [d. at 219-20, 431 N.E.2d at 221. 
33 /d. 
34 [d. at 224, 431 N.E.2d at 223. 
35 344 Mass. 406, 182 N.E.2d 535 (1962). 
36 /d. at 408, 182 N.E.2d at 537. 
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change was motivated by the town's repositioning of a street and was 
ruled to be "colorably within the exemption applicable to nonconforming 
uses. "37 The Cape Resort Court explained that the "dramatic" changes 
in nonconforming uses in this case were not approved by any municipal 
officials nor were they colorably within the protection afforded by section 
6 of the Act.38 Thus the Court refused to weaken the established rule in 
Massachusetts that laches and estoppel are not defenses in a suit brought 
to enforce municipal zoning regulations. 39 
Lastly, the Court refuted the argument that the restriction of dance and 
music in any nonconforming hotel conflicted with the right of free speech 
protected under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States 
Constitution and article sixteen of the Declaration of Rights of the Massa-
chusetts Constitution.4o The Supreme Judicial Court determined that its 
decision in Commonwealth v. Sees ,41 which invalidated under article 
sixteen the specific application of a municipal regulation that prohibited 
topless dancing in a bar, was not germane to the instant case. The 
municipal authorities in Sees applied the regulation there in an unaccepta-
ble manner by "distinguishing protected expression on the basis of con-
tent" without any demonstrated public interest.42 No similar type of 
conduct was alleged by the hotel owners in the present case and Sees 
would not be interpreted to mean that "an owner of a nonconforming 
hotel has an absolute right to develop facilities for music and dancing on 
as large a scale as he sees fit. "43 For these reasons, the Court found that 
an abridgment of constitutional rights had not been demonstrated.44 
The Cape Resort Court also addressed the nonconforming use status of 
two of the resort's subsidiary structures. An impermissible change in use 
had occurred in one building that had been converted from a lodging 
house for resort employees to quarters for paying quests.45 According to 
the Court, such a change of use was a "commercial venture" providing a 
new form of service that was unacceptable under the relevant local by-law 
and section 6 of the Act.46 The status of the second subsidiary building, 
however, remained unchanged.47 The building had been sold in 1962 by 
37 ld. at 409, 182 N.E.2d at 538. 
38 385 Mass. at 225, 431 N.E.2d at 224. 
39 ld. See McAleer v. Bd. of Appeals of Barnstable, 361 Mass. 317,280 N.E.2d 166 
(1972); Ferrante v. Bd. of Appeals of Northampton, 345 Mass. 158, 186 N.E.2d 471 (1962). 
40 385 Mass. at 225, 431 N.E.2d at 224. 
41 374 Mass. 532, 373 N .E.2d 1151 (1978). 
42 385 Mass. at 225, 431 N.E.2d at 224. 
43 ld. 
44 [d. 
4S ld. at 222, 431 N.E.2d at 222. 
46 ld. at 223, 431 N.E.2d at 223. 
47 ld. at 220-21, 431 N.E.2d at 221-22. 
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previous owners of the hotel and reconveyed thirteen years later to the 
current owners.48 The same use of the building, to provide lodging for 
paying guests, was maintained at all relevant times.49 The relevant local 
ordinance stated that "when a nonconforming use has been discontinued 
for a period of one year, it shall not be reestablished." so Referring to prior 
case law, the Court noted that "discontinued" in the above quoted 
ordinance connotes "abandonment"Sl and accordingly the principle that 
a conveyance of property does not amount to the abandonment of a valid 
nonconforming use was applicable.52 Therefore, the Court needed only to 
restate that the building had always been used for the same purposes to 
dispose of the issue.s3 
§ 15.5. Reestablishment of Lapsed Variance. The scope of variance 
granting power of a municipality is limited by the final paragraph of 
section 10 of the Zoning Act,l which states: "If the rights authorized by a 
variance are not exercised within one year of the date of grant of stich 
variance they shall lapse, and may be reestablished only after notice and a 
new hearing pursuant to this section." During the Survey year in Hunters 
Brook Realty Corporation v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Bourne, 2 the 
Appeals Court construed this provision of section 10 as reflecting a 
"bright line test" and consequently held that a party seeking the reestab-
lishment of a lapsed variance must make a new and independent showing 
that the conditions for the granting of a variance exist. 3 The court's 
decision reversed the superior court's ruling that the holder of a lapsed 
variance is entitled to regain his former rights so long as there have not 
been any material changes in the applicable zoning law or in the various 
qualities of the land itself since the date the variance was initially 
granted.4 
The developer in Hunters Brook Realty desired to build both town 
houses and cluster homes on a parcel of land zoned partly for residential 
use and partly for scenic development. 5 The developer applied for and 
48 [d. at 220, 431 N.E.2d at 221-22. 
49 [d. at 221, 431 N.E.2d at 222. 
so [d. at 220, 431 N.E.2d at 222. 
SI [d. (citing Pioneer Insulation & Modernizing Corp. v. Lynn, 331 Mass. 560, 120 N.E.2d 
913 (1954». 
52 [d. at 221, 431 N.E.2d at 222 (citing Wayland v. Lee, 325 Mass. 637, 91 N.E.2d 835 
(1950); Revere v. Rowe Contracting Co., 326 Mass. 884, 289 N.E.2d 830 (1972». 
53 [d. 
§ 15.5. I G.L. c. 40A, § 10. 
2 14 Mass. App. Ct. 76, 436 N.E.2d 978 (1982). 
3 [d. at 77, 84, 436 N.E.2d at 979, 983. 
4 [d. at 84, 436 N.E.2d at 980. 
S [d. 
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received variances from local ordinances prescribing relevant dimen-
sional and intensity of use requirements. 6 Certain conditions were then 
attached to the variances following an appeal by the town planning board 
to the superior court.? The developer failed to exercise the rights au-
thorized by the variances within a year of the superior court's judgment, 
however, and eventually its application to reestablish the variances pur-
suant to section 10 of the Zoning Act was denied by the zoning board of 
appeals. 8 
The Appeals Court based its decision to uphold the bOl;l.rd's denial on a 
combination of the literal meaning of the words in the last paragraph of 
section 10 and the relevant legislative history.9 The "operative words of 
the statute," "shall," "may," "lapse," and "pursuant," were each indi-
vidually defined using prior case law and primary definitional sources.lO 
The Appeals Court concluded: 
Based on these simple and straightforward definitions, the words used in the 
last paragraph of [section] 10, read in context with the rest of the statute, 
convey the clear impression that variance rights which are not seasonably 
exercised will automatically become void; that the holder of a lapsed vari-
ance who seeks to reestablish rights must initiate a new proceeding under 
[section] 10; [and] that he must therefore make a new showing of the 
requirements set out in the first paragraph of that statute. I I 
Accordingly, the court held, "it is for the board ... to decide the matter 
[of reestablishment of a lapsed variance] in the exercise of its discre-
tion." 12 
§ 15.6. Special Permits - Interpretation of Local Law. The zoning board 
of appeals is generally the tribunal of first impression when an issue 
involves the interpretation of local law .1 Although a zoning board's con-
struction of an ordinance is entitled to great deference, a court will 
nevertheless reverse a decision that conflicts with its view of legislative 
6 /d. at 77-78, 436 N. E.2d at 980. 
7 /d. at 78, 436 N.E.2d at 980. 
8 /d. at 79, 436 N.E.2d at 981. 
9 [d. at 8(}'83, 436 N.E.2d at 981-83. The relevant legislative history indicated that the 
Legislature "considered and rejected language which could have left the criteria for reestab-
lishing a lapsed variance open to local definition and control." [d. at 83, 436 N .E.2d at 983. 
10 /d. at 80, 436 N.E.2d at 982. The court determined that, as used in section 10, "shall" 
communicates an "imperative obligation," "may" indicates "the existence of discretion," 
"lapse" means to "become void or ineffective" and relates to "the termination of a right or 
privilege ... through failure of some contingency," and "pursuant" means "in confor-
mance to or agreement with." [d. 
II /d. at 8(}'81, 436 N.E.2d at 982. 
12 [d. at 81, 436 N.E.2d at 982. 
§ 15.6. I 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 19.18, at 423 (2d ed. 1977). 
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construction,2 At times, judicial and administrative construction are en-
tirely consistent,3 and in some instances, as in the Survey year decision of 
Balas v. Board of Appeals of Plymouth,4 a court will even expand the 
scope of aboard's previous interpretation. 
In Balas the local zoning board of appeals granted a special permit with 
environmental design conditions to the developer and owners of the 
prospective site of a shopping center.S The board of appeals stated, 
however, that "all conditions must be satisfied in the form of existing 
consultant reports, binding agreements, and plans approved and endorsed 
by the [p llanning [b loard. "6 The board also "expressly reserved to itself 
the right to review those plans which the planning board disapproved. "7 
The plaintiff brought an action challenging the board's decision as being in 
excess of its authority. In affirming the decision of the board, the superior 
court determined that the condition that the board imposed applied not 
only to plans disapproved by the planning board but also to those ~p­
proved.s 
On review, the Appeals Court found the superior court's conclusion 
acceptable, especially given the "complex and detailed" nature of the 
applicable Plymouth zoning by-Iaw.9 The Appeals Court, however, held 
that, in order for the board to act within its authority, it would have to 
extend its previous decision through an amendment specifically reserving 
the right to review plans approved by the planning board. lo 
In another Survey year decision, Howland v. Board of Appeals of 
Plymouth, II the Appeals Court again considered the proper construction 
of a Plymouth zoning ordinance, this time concerning the parking facility 
standards within a waterfront district. The local provisions at issue in-
2 /d. See also Pendergast v. Bd. of Appe;i.ls of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 120 N.E.2d 
(1954); Huber, Zoning and Land Use, 1979 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 15.7, at 428. 
3 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note I, at § 19.18, at 423. 
4 13 Mass. App. Ct. 995, 432 N .E.2d 742 (1982). 
5 [d. at 995, 432 N.E.2d at 743. . 
6 [d. at 996, 432 N .E.2d at 743-44 (brackets supplied). The "board of appeals" should not 
be confused with the "planning board." The latter is responsible for adopting zoning 
regulations and is sometimes replaced by the board of selectman. G.L. c. 40A, § 6. The 
former is the authority designated to hear appeals from any person "aggrieved" under the 
Zoning Enabling Act. G.L. c. 40A, § 13. The planning board does, however, act as an appeal 
forum from the point in time that an ordinance is adopted until the mayor or selectmen 
appoints the members of the board of appeals. G.L. c. 40A, § 14. 
7 [d. at 995, 432 N .E.2d at 743 (emphasis added). 
8 [d. at 996, 432 N.E.2d at 744. 
9 [d. 
10 /d. (emphasis added). The court therefore remanded the case with instructions that if 
the board made the appropriate change within thirty days, the superior court judgment that 
the board did not exceed its authority would stand. [d. at 997, 432 N.E.2d at 744. 
II 13 Mass. App. Ct. 520, 434 N.E.2d 1286 (1982). 
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cluded the requirements that: (1) "parking space ... be on the same lot as 
the principal use served, or if not reasonably possible, in the same district 
within 400 feet of the principal building;" (2) "[s]uch off premises parking 
shall be in possession, by deed or lease of the owner of the use served;" 
and (3) there be at least one parking space per three seats or "one space 
for each 50 square feet of gross floor area, whichever is greater."12 The 
defendant in Howland applied for a special permit to construct a second 
floor and terrace on his restaurant. 13 The restaurant was situated on the 
town wharf. 14 In granting the special permit, the zoning board of appeals 
found that the town wharf had sufficient parking and that no variance was 
required .15 The plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their appeal of this decision 
to the superior court. 16 That court found that the municipally owned 
wharf was itself a "lot" under the applicable Plymouth zoning by-law, 
while the land associated with the restaurant itself was but a "parcel" of 
that 10t.J7 In applying this determination to the relevant facts the superior 
court ruled that "ample parking exists, owned by the owner of [the wharf] 
... , within the confines of [the wharf] and within 400 feet of [the 
restaurant]. "18 The judge, apparently focusing on the requirement that 
the parking be on the lot served, therefore held that the conditions of the 
local by-law were satisfied. 19 
The Appeals Court reversed. The intent behind the relevant ordinance 
as perceived by the court from the wording of the law proved to be 
dispositive. The court stated: 
By the use oflanguage that required parking to be located "on the same lot 
as the principal use served," it was the intent of the zoning by-law to have 
parking located on the premises where the use was located, if possible. The 
language in the by-law shows that it is the person who possesses the special 
use who must have the required number of parking spaces ... not the 
owner of the 'lot' or 'parcel' on which the use will be 10cated.20 
Because there was insufficient space for parking on the restaurant own-
er's premises and the option of leasing or purchasing parking space within 
400 feet of the locus was not exercised, the court concluded that the 
requirements of the zoning by-law were not met.21 Moreover, the Appeals 
Court ruled that the lower court's finding of "ample parking" space was 
12 Id. at 522-23, 434 N .E.2d at 1288 (brackets supplied). 
13 Id. at 520, 434 N.E.2d at 1287. 
14 Id. 
15 /d. at 521, 434 N.E.2d at 1287. 
16 Id. at 522, 434 N.E.2d at 1288. 
17 /d. 
18 /d. (brackets added). 
19Id. 
20 Id. at 522-23, 434 N .E.2d at 1288. 
21 Id. at 523, 434 N.E.2d at 1288. 
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erroneous because the superior court judge had failed to apply the numer-
ical standard delineated in the local by-law. 22 
The decision of the Appeals Court in Howland properly interprets the 
language of the Plymouth zoning law. The superior court's decision may, 
however, have been a more sensible resolution of the issue. Nevertheless, 
it is inappropriate in this type of case for a court to overrule the local law , 
even when it appears that the letter of the local ordinance does not follow 
the general policy behind it. It is certainly possible that the purpose of the 
local law examined in Howland, to provide adequate parking, was 
satisfied by the wharf parking space then available. Such a decision, 
however, is one to be made by the municipality, not by the court. 
22 /d. (citing Josephs v. Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 362 Mass. 290, 285 N.E.2d 436 
(1972)). 
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